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ARGUMENTS 
I. LAMOREAUX PROPERLY MARSHALLED 
Appellee argues Lamoreaux had a duty to and failed to properly marshal. 
Lamoreaux respectfully disagrees. Marshalling requires the appellant to marshall all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988); See also 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Lamoreaux did exactly 
that and therefore properly marshaled. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT FOLLOWING 
THE REPEAL OF RULE 69, URCP, A PARTY MAY STILL EXECUTE 
UPON A CHOSE IN ACTION. 
In Applied Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, 44 P.3d 699, the 
Court held execution of a chose in action is permissible. However, because Applied 
Medical Technologies relied on now repealed Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. Pro., it is no longer 
binding precedent. Upon repeal of Rule 69, no companion rule was adopted which 
expressly provides for the execution upon and sale of a chose in action. Therefore, it is 
clear that the drafters of the rule no longer sanctioned such sharp practices. 
As acknowledged by Appellee, there are no Utah cases interpreting the effect of 
the repeal of former Rule 69. As such, whether the right to execute upon a chose in 
action remains after the repeal of Rule 69 presents a question of first impression. 
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While the Appellee diagrams the various provisions of former Rule 69 which 
provided a basis for executing upon a chose in action, it glosses over the language of the 
rules which remain in effect at the time of the execution and sale of the chose in action in 
this case. Rule 64(a)(9), Utah R. Civ. Pro. defines "Property" as meaning the defendant's 
property of any type not exempt from seizure. Property includes but is not limited to real 
and personal property, tangible and intangible property, the right to property whether due 
or to become due, and an obligation of a third person to perform for the defendant." 
There is no Utah cases which specifically states that a chose in action is intangible 
personal property. 
Rule 69A, Utah R. Civ. Pro. allows for the execution on property. However, the 
Rule gives a right to the Defendant to provide a preference regarding what personal 
property may be attached and sold to satisfy the debt. See Rule 69A(a). However, in the 
instant case, Lamoreaux was not given the opportunity to express that preference. The 
result was clearly inequitable. The Appeln accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this order is sent to you for your review. If you do not object to the order within five 
(5) days, the original will be sent to the judge for signature. A copy of this order is being sent to: 
llee acquired property potentially valued at $500,000.00 sold to satisfy a judgment valued 
under $20,000.00. Thus, Appellee's received a windfall in excess of $480,000.00. It is 
this type of inequity which results in Lamoreaux characterizing the execution and sale of 
a chose in action as a "sharp practice." 
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With the repeal of former Rule 69(f), the express basis for execution on a chose in 
action no longer exists. Lamoreaux believes that based on that repeal, execution on a 
chose in action is no longer permitted by Utah law. Therefore, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law by permitting the Appellee to execute upon and sell the chose in action, 
resulting in an equitable result and a windfall in excess of $480,000.00. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HOLD 
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON WHETHER LAMOREAUX 
TRANSFERRED HIS INTEREST IN THIS ACTION THEREBY 
PRECLUDING BLACK DIAMOND FROM PURCHASING THE CHOSE 
IN ACTION AT THE EXECUTION SALE. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Whether 
to grant an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Barbir v. Orem City, 
2005 UT App 114. During oral argument on the Motion, Lamoreaux's counsel argued it 
was improper for the trial court to grant a summary disposition on the issue of whether 
Black Diamond purchased an interest in the chose of action, based on Lamoreaux's 
assignment of his interest to his son. (Hearing Transcript., P. 23, L. 20 to P. 24, L. 10). 
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent is a mixed question of law and fact. See e.g. 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). However, in determining whether 
there was a transfer of Lamoreaux's interest, Black Diamond should have brought an 
action under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, UCA §25-6-1, et seq. Further, assuming 
the Court was willing to render any determination regarding the transfer, the burden was 
on the Court to consider those elements set forth in Utah Code Annotated §25-6-5. All of 
these elements of intent required an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lamoreaux 
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held any interest at the time of execution or sale and whether the assignment of his 
interest was valid or otherwise a fraudulent transfer. 
Nonetheless, the Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. It was an abuse of 
discretion for the Court to fail to hold an evidentiary hearing, summarily granting the 
Motion to Substitute despite the conflicting evidence before the Court that Lamoreaux 
held no interest in the chose in action. This Court should reverse the trial court and 
remand with instruction to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lamoreaux 
owned any interest in the chose in action at the time of the execution and sale. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE 
The trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to substitute Black 
Diamond in as the party plaintiff. (R000570). Whether to substitute a party pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is within the discretion of the trial court which will 
only be reversed on appeal if said discretion was abused. See Rule 25(c), Utah R. Civ. 
Pro. Substitution is based on Rules 25, 64E, and 69A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
was inequitable to permit substitution in this case based on the completed trial and 
pending judicial determination. The equities weighed against substitution of any party 
for the Plaintiff. This action had been completed up through a trial on the merits. The 
parties awaited the trial court's decision based on the evidence of record. Because Rule 
25(c) specifically contemplates the continuation of the action in the name of the original 
party, the appropriate action would have been for the Court to deny the motion to 
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substitute but rather to rule on the merits of the action. Thereafter, if the Court 
determined Black Diamond was the successful purchaser at a properly conducted sale 
which is authorized by Utah law, the resulting judgment (if any) could have been 
addressed in numerous ways, including the filing of a satisfaction thereof. It was 
improper to substitute Black Diamond as the party plaintiff under the procedural posture 
of the action. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED LAMOREAUX WAS 
COLLATERALLY ATTACKING A SISTER COURT JUDGMENT. 
The trial court erred in concluding Lamoreaux objection to the Motion to Substitute 
based on the alleged purchase of the chose in action constituted an impermissible 
collateral attack on a sister court's judgment. (R. 000573). A trial court's determination 
of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard which is afforded no degree of 
deference. United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 
f 9, 79 P.3d 945. Lamoreaux did not collaterally attack the Fisher case judgment. 
Lamoreaux challenged the procedure of executing upon a chose in action and its sale as 
void, as forming the basis for a Motion to Substitute as a party plaintiff. Such a challenge 
does not constitute an impermissible collateral attack. See e.g. Costanzo v. Harris, 71 
Wn.2d 254, 427 P.2d 963 (1967). Even assuming the challenge to the Motion to 
Substitute based on the alleged purchase of the chose in action at the execution sale is a 
collateral attack, where Utah law no longer authorizes the execution upon a chose in 
action, such execution and sale are void. Void proceedings are subject to collateral 
9 
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attack. See e.g. Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49,1fl[8-9, 228 P.3d 1250. The Court 
erred as a matter of law in ruling it was an impermissible collateral attack on a sister 
court judgment. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
RENDER A DECISION ON THE MERITS. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to render a decision on the merits of the 
action after more than six months when the trial court took the matter under advisement 
on February 17,2011. (R. 000572). District judges "have broad discretion in managing 
the cases assigned to their courts, which is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on 
appeal. Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, \ 23, 222 P.3d 775, cert, 
denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010).In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 
(1967), the United States Supreme Court stated, "It is a judge's duty to decide all cases 
within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that 
arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants." Judge Ludlow failed in that admonition. 
This failure resulted in a violation of the spirit of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct. In the instant case, Judge Ludlow did not decide the matter promptly as 
required by Canon 3. This was an abuse of discretion. See e.g. Merriam v. Board of 
Review, 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App. 1991); In re Smith, 687 A.2d 1229 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 
1996); State v. Maggard, 126 Idaho 477, 886 P.2d 782 (App. 1994); Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625,499 S.E.2d 538 (1998); State v. Erlewin, 755 N.E.2d 700, 
707 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). In the instant action, Judge Ludlow failed to promptly decide 
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the case. It was error as a matter of law to both grant the substitution of Black Diamond 
as a party plaintiff and dismiss the action without deciding the case on the merits. These 
actions should be reversed and this case remanded to the trial court to enter a decision on 
the merits. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DISMISSING 
THE ACTION AND THEREBY DEFEATING THE PARK FIRM'S 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO COMPENSATION. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the case following substitution of the Defendant as 
party Plaintiff without ruling on the merits of the case after trial, thereby effectively 
precluding counsel for the Plaintiff who had prepared and tried the case from receiving 
any compensation for the services rendered. Lamoreaux entered into an employment 
agreement with the Park Firm on a one third contingency basis. While a client may 
discharge his attorney at any time as a matter of right, the attorney is nonetheless entitled 
to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered to the date of discharge. Saucier 
v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So.2d 102 (La. 1979). 
In the instant case, Lamoreaux never terminated his agreement with the Park Firm. 
Instead, Lamoreaux's interest in the outcome of the litigation was allegedly purchased at 
the Execution Sale by Black Diamond, resulting in dismissal of the action. By so 
dismissing the action, Black Diamond effectively constructively discharged the Park 
Firm, without cause and without paying any compensation. In P.A.D.D. v. Graystone 
Pines Homeowners, 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), the Court found in that following 
discharge, the attorney was entitled to recovery under a theory of quantum meruit Id at 
11 
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58; see also Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, 1003 (1900). Following 
dismissal in the instant case, the Park Firm was provided no remedy or right to receive 
any compensation. This Court should reverse the trial court and remand for further 
proceedings, specifically ordering the Court to consider the quantum meruit value of the 
services rendered by the Park Firm. 
VIII. APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellee argues an entitlement to attorney fees. No award of attorney fees should 
be granted to Appellee. Further, Appellee, even if entitled to an award of attorney fees, is 
not entitled to such an award against the Park Firm. 
Appellee's argument to substantiate the claim for attorney fees focuses on the 
"problem" with arguing a right to such fees on appeal, based primarily on Appellee's 
motion for summary disposition in this action which was denied. Appellee's 
characterization of "problems" with the argument does not provide any basis for an 
award of attorney fees on appeal, neither against Lamoreaux nor the Park Firm. 
Appellee did not file a counter appeal. Nonetheless, it seeks affirmative relief on 
appeal in the form of an award of attorney fees. Further, no award of attorney fees was 
granted by the trial court. Generally, "when a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'1 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). In the instant case, Appellee's 
were not awarded attorney fees below. 
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Appellee argues there are "problems" with arguments made on appeal. However, 
when attorney fees are not awarded by the trial court, the standard on appeal is whether 
the appeal is frivilous. Attorney fees may be awarded on appeal if the appeal is frivolous. 
Utah R.App.P. 33. A frivolous appeal is "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law." Utah R.App.P. 33(b). However, an unsuccessful appeal which has some 
merit is not frivolous. See Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Utah App. 
1991). 
In the instant case, the appeal is not frivolous. The appeal is grounded in fact, is 
warranted either by existing law or is made on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
reverse, or clarify existing law. Therefore, no basis exists for this Court to award 
attorney fees to Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings. 
First, the trial court erred in ruling that a chose of action may be executed upon after the 
repeal of Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. Pro. Second, the Court erred by not holding an 
evidentiary hearing on whether Lamoreaux owned any interest in the chose in action at 
the time of the execution and sale. Third, the trial court's grant of the motion to 
substitute should be reversed. Fourth, the trial court's motion to dismiss should be 
reversed. Fifth, the trial court should be ordered to decide the action on the merits. 
Sixth, the Court should order the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the quantum 
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meruit value of the services rendered by the Park Firm in prosecuting this action which 
fees should be charged to and be ordered to be paid by Black Diamond. Finally, Black 
Diamond is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
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